I argue that Aristotle cannot consider the enkratic (self-controlled person) and akratic (person lacking self-control) to be different kinds of people. Instead, according to what he tells us, the difference between them can only be one of degree. Given the limited scope of akrasia proper, as well as the very specific epistemic failure of the akratic, the akratic is enkratic most of the time. As such, the akratic is the same kind of person as the enkratic. This means that healing morally bad character is easier than it is usually thought to be, even on Aristotle’s account.   

Dissertation Abstract


“The Contemptuous Attitude of Aristotle’s Megalopsuchos”

       Rackham Interdisciplinary Workshop (October 31, 2020)

       Pennsylvania Circle of Ancient Philosophy (March 24, 2019)

“The Proper Scope of Akrasia”

       North Carolina Philosophical Society (March 28, 2020) Cancelled due to Covid-19


“Aristotle’s Akratic and the Drunk”

       Minnesota Philosophical Society (October 26, 2019)

“Answering the Situationist Critique”

       University of North Florida Student Philosophy Conference (March 28, 2015)    

       University of Nevada, Reno Graduate Philosophy Conference (October 25, 2014)

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